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COMMENT
SETTLING WITH YOUR HANDS TIED:
WHY JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IS
NEEDED TO CURB AN EXPANDING
INTERPRETATION OF THE FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

PETE J. GEORGIS *
FCPA enforcement is stronger than it’s ever been—and getting
stronger. **

INTRODUCTION
The United States has been combating corruption in international
business transactions for over thirty years. 1 By adopting legislation

*
J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco,
California; B.A. 2007, Economics, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C. I would
like to thank my family and friends for their boundless love and support. I would also like to thank
the Golden Gate University Law Review Editorial Board, without whose guidance this paper would
not have been published. I am especially grateful to Professor Wes Porter who provided helpful
comments on a previous draft.
**
Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer, Address at the 24th National Conference
on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010), available at www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/
speeches/2010/crm-speech-101116.html.
1
See Ann Hollingshead, A Brief History of U.S. Policy Toward Foreign Bribery, TASK
FORCE ON FINANCIAL INTEGRITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (July 28, 2010),
www.financialtaskforce.org/2010/07/28/a-brief-history-of-u-s-policy-toward-foreign-bribery.
The
United States took an assertive position to become the first country to criminalize global corporate
bribery. Id. During the 1980s and 1990s, Congress negotiated with the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) to seek an agreement with major trading partners that anticorruption legislation would be enacted. Id. The United States has led the way in criminalizing the
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criminalizing the payment of bribes overseas, the United States has been
a leader in setting anti-corruption policies. 2 Although the United States
has endeavored to combat the unethical payment of bribes through the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 3 the vagueness of the statute—
specifically the business nexus requirement—has led to corporate
uncertainty and unnecessarily expensive compliance programs. 4 One
factor motivating Congress’s staunch support for criminalization has
been the devastating effect these bribes are having on global economies. 5
The World Bank conservatively estimates that the annual amount of
worldwide bribery flowing from the private sector to the public sector is
approximately $1 trillion. 6
In 1977, Congress enacted the FCPA as a component of the 1934
Securities and Exchange Act. 7 The principal goal of the law is to hold
U.S. companies and individuals criminally liable for bribing foreign
officials in exchange for lucrative business agreements. 8 The FCPA’s
efforts to criminalize bribery payments to foreign officials stem from the
inimical effects such payments have on economic and political stability.9

act of bribing a public official, and has garnered the support of thirty-seven countries spanning six
continents. See ORG. OF ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING
BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS:
RATIFICATION STATUS AS OF MARCH 2009, available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/13/
40272933.pdf.
2
Barbara Crutchfield George, Kathleen A. Lacey & Jutta Birmele, On the Threshold of the
Adoption of Global Antibribery Legislation: A Critical Analysis of Current Domestic and
International Efforts Toward the Reduction of Business Corruption, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1,
3 (1999).
3
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78ff, 78m (Westlaw 2012)).
4
Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 259 (1997); Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA
Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 1001 (2010). Statutory vagueness has caused business
entities to bar all payments to foreign officials. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical
Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. at 259. For example, after
settling with the government for $500,000, a U.S. advertising firm established a policy of prohibiting
its employees from making any payments to government officials. Id. at 259 n.198. This policy
decision was aimed at avoiding potential liability in the FCPA’s grey areas. Id.
5
See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 4 (1977) (Conf. Rep.).
6
Six Questions on the Cost of Corruption with World Bank Institute Global Governance
Director Daniel Kaufmann, THE WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/KQH743GKF1 (last visited
Jan. 7, 2012).
7
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78ff, 78m (Westlaw 2012)).
8
Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. at 230.
9
Mark J. Murphy, Comment, International Bribery: An Example of an Unfair Trade
Practice?, 21 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 385, 391 (1995).
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These destabilizing effects stretch beyond a single country’s borders and
permeate the global system. 10 For instance, between 1994 and 1999, the
U.S. Department of Commerce found that American exporters lost $45
billion of international business to overseas competitors who paid
bribes. 11 Additionally, bribery is thought to have influenced the outcome
of 294 international contracts involving $145 billion in trade. 12 The
significant effect that bribery has on the markets has also led to investors
exiting areas with intense graft in search of less risky environments. 13
Such evidence illustrates that corruption aggravates capital flight and
discourages foreign investment, thereby significantly increasing business
transaction costs. 14 Furthermore, by threatening legitimacy and eroding
confidence in market institutions, foreign bribery negatively impacts the
entire international community. 15 Through FCPA enforcement, the U.S.

10

See Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 83, 85-87 (2007).
11
Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. at 256.
12
Ambassador Cynthia P. Schneider, The Global Fight Against Bribery And Corruption:
U.S. Law and Policy, Address at the Transparency Unveiling Corruption Conference in Amsterdam
(Oct. 1, 1999), available at http://ihcrp.georgetown.edu/lifesciandsociety/pdfs/bribery100199.pdf.
13
See United Nations Crime and Justice Information Network, Press Kit, The Cost of
Corruption, Tenth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders (Feb. 2000), available at www.un.org/events/10thcongress/2088b.htm (“‘It is widely
acknowledged that corruption scares away foreign investment and development aid,’ according to
Pino Arlacchi, Executive Director of the Vienna-based United Nations Office for Drug Control and
Crime Prevention (ODCCP). ‘Obviously, it is wiser to invest in countries with more transparency,
independent and well-regulated banks and strong court systems.’”).
14
Nancy Zucker Boswell, Combating Corruption: Focus on Latin America, 3 SW. J. L. &
TRADE AM. 179, 183-84 (1996) (“The former director general of development at the European
Commission has asserted that the losses caused by corruption far exceed the sum of individual
profits derived from it because the graft distorts the entire economy.”). The prevalence of corruption
affects a country’s resources, revenues, and government procurement. Id. As a result, public works
contracts contain a costly premium that raises the price of a project by a significant amount. Id. The
distortion of government procurement misallocates public resources and accumulates a devastating
long-term debt. Id. Foreign investment is also reduced because companies are hesitant to enter a
market when the cost of doing business is unpredictable. Cortney C. Thomas, Note, The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of Rapid Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV.
LITIG. 439, 441 (2010). Risk-averse companies would refuse to be at the mercy of corrupt foreign
officials when large amounts of capital hinge on government cooperation. Id.
15
Boswell, Combating Corruption: Focus on Latin America, 3 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. at
184 (stating that corruption threatens democracy and erodes public trust in state-owned institutions
and government officials); Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer, Statement Before the
Senate
Committee
on
the
Judiciary
(Jan.
26,
2011),
available
at
www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/testimony/2011/crm-testimony-110126.html (“[C]orruption and bribery
works to the detriment of us all, stifling competition, imposing an insidious and illegal fee on
business transactions, and undermining the transparency and honesty of corporate culture.”);
Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer, Address at the 24th National Conference on the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010), available at www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/
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government is able to punish sordid business practices while encouraging
more ethical values amongst the American public. 16 More importantly,
the United States’ interest in enforcing the FCPA is to curb economic
waste and protect the integrity of American political institutions. 17
Despite this interest, however, prosecutions for FCPA violations have
been lax until recently. 18
Since 2004, the U.S. government has devoted vast resources toward
prosecuting FCPA violations. 19 The Fifth Circuit’s decision in United
States v. Kay 20 precipitated the Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) renewed
focus on curtailing the corporate payment of bribes. 21 Specifically,
Kay’s broad interpretation of the business nexus requirement—a
provision in the FCPA that requires a connection between the bribery
payment and its anticipated effect 22 —paved the way for prosecutors to
indict companies based on payments that directly or indirectly “obtain or

2010/crm-speech-101116.html (“[B]ribery in international business transactions weakens economic
development, . . . undermines confidence in the marketplace, and . . . distorts competition.”).
16
See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4-5 (1977) (Conf. Rep.) (stating that the purpose of the Act is
to prohibit corrupt business practices because they run counter to the “moral expectations and values
of the American public”).
17
See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 4 (1977) (Conf. Rep.).
18
Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 256 (1997); see also Priya Cherian Huskins, FCPA
Prosecutions: Liability Trend to Watch, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1449 (2008) (stating that before
2000, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) averaged
only three FCPA prosecutions per year); GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2011 YEAR-END FCPA
UPDATE
(Jan.
3,
2012),
available
at
www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/
2011YearEndFCPAUpdate.aspx (noting that 2010 and 2011 have been the most prolific years for
FCPA enforcement with seventy-four actions in 2010 and forty-eight in 2011); GIBSON, DUNN &
CRUTCHER LLP, 2010 MID-YEAR FCPA UPDATE (July 8, 2010), available at
www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2010Mid-YearFCPAUpdate.aspx (noting that since 2000,
FCPA enforcement has been trending upward, with thirty-eight actions brought in 2007, thirty-three
in 2008, and forty in 2009).
19
Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer, Address at the Annual Meeting of the
Washington Metropolitan Area Corporate Counsel Association (Jan. 26, 2011), available at
www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-110126.html (stating that the Fraud Section
of the Department of Justice has hired a number of experienced prosecutors devoted solely to
combat bribery, and has implemented changes that have significantly increased FCPA enforcement);
Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, Address at the American Bar Association White Collar
Crime Conference (Mar. 1, 2007), available at www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2007/
ag_speech_070301.html (“The Department [of Justice] has substantially increased its focus and
attention on [FCPA violations.]”).
20
United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004).
21
See Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 921 (2010)
(“[T]he [Kay] decision clearly energized the enforcement agencies and post-Kay there has been an
explosion in FCPA enforcement actions . . . .”).
22
Kay, 359 F.3d at 744.
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retain business.” 23 In light of increased FCPA enforcement, the scarcity
of legislative history and judicial scrutiny regarding the business nexus
requirement has effectively conferred ultimate discretionary authority on
the DOJ and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to
determine the nexus’s scope. 24
Accordingly, the lack of legislative and judicial guidance has given
rise to a climate of apprehension and fear for American businesses. 25
Corporate compliance with the FCPA is difficult, given the ambiguous
nature of the statute, yet the legislature and courts have nonetheless
failed to clearly define what conduct is prohibited by the statute. 26 As a
result, U.S. businesses are left to fill in the gaps. 27 Ultimately, riskaverse companies have been forced into an environment where
heightened levels of risk and over-compliance have led to the formation
of intricate and expensive corporate compliance programs. 28
This Comment therefore argues that the broad interpretation of the
FCPA’s business nexus requirement, which criminalizes payments that
both directly and indirectly “obtain or retain business,” encourages
prosecutorial abuse and deviates from the intended purpose of the Act.
The Justice Department’s expansive approach to FCPA enforcement has
cost companies tremendously, 29 even though the Act’s drafters intended
for a more balanced approach. 30 Part I of this Comment will discuss the
history and background of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 and
its amendments in 1988 and 1998. Part II will examine the application of
the business nexus requirement in United States v. Kay 31 and argue that
23

See id. at 755.
See Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. at 918 (stating that
the DOJ and SEC aggressively interpret the business nexus requirement).
25
See Sarah Johnson, Deal-Breaker: Fear of the FCPA, CFO.COM (Feb. 15, 2011),
www.cfo.com/article.cfm/14555334 (stating that businesses have become “wary of the potential
business partner’s lack of transparency, payment structures in contracts, or relationships between its
executives and government officials or third parties”).
26
Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act—1977 to 2010,
12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 89, 101-03 (2010).
27
See id. at 103 (noting that during the first decade of enforcement, the ambiguity of the
statute had dissuaded companies from venturing overseas to do business). Since then, the business
nexus requirement has still never been defined, and the FCPA has never been amended to clarify this
term. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (Westlaw 2012).
28
See Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. at 1001.
29
Id. at 1001-02 (stating that risk-averse companies that seek to do business in foreign
markets feel compelled to implement costly and unnecessary FCPA compliance programs only to
appease prosecutors and to avoid formal charges ex ante).
30
See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4-5 (1977) (Conf. Rep.) (creating the “facilitating payments”
exception to ensure that despite the prohibition on corrupt payments, companies would still be able
to make payments to receive favorable treatment from low-level officials).
31
United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004).
24
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its interpretation is inconsistent with the FCPA’s purpose. Part III will
examine enforcement measures used by the DOJ and the SEC in a postKay world. Finally, Part IV will propose that judicial intervention in
these enforcement measures is necessary to alleviate some of the
challenges that currently exist, as well as to guide companies in
distinguishing lawful from unlawful conduct.
I.

THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

President Jimmy Carter signed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
into law in 1977, 32 making the United States the first country to outlaw
the payment of bribes to foreign officials. 33 The political will of
Congress had shifted toward reining in these unethical activities. 34 In
essence, federal legislators sought to prohibit the type of bribery that
influences public officials to abuse their discretionary authority and
disrupts market efficiency and foreign relations. 35 To better understand
the drafters’ intent, this Comment will discuss the origins of the FCPA,
its subsequent amendments, and the business nexus requirement.

32

See Jimmy Carter, Foreign Corrupt Practices and Investment Disclosure Bill: Statement on
Signing S. 305 into Law, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2157 (Dec. 20, 1977), available at
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7036 (“[B]ribery is ethically repugnant and
competitively unnecessary. Corrupt practices between corporations and public officials overseas
undermine the integrity and stability of governments and harm our relations with other countries.
Recent revelations of widespread overseas bribery have eroded public confidence in our basic
institutions.”).
33
Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 230 (1997) (stating that the United States is the first
country to criminalize the extraterritorial payments of bribes by domestic companies). It took almost
twenty years before other countries enacted their own anti-bribery statutes. In 1997, thirty-eight
countries signed the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, including most European Union countries,
Canada, and the United States. See ORG. OF ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD CONVENTION ON
COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS:
RATIFICATION STATUS AS OF 24 NOVEMBER 2005, available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/
13/40272933.pdf (listing ratifying countries).
34
Once the SEC and IRS investigations uncovered the questionable payments, Congress
spent the next two and half years hearing testimony and considering House and Senate versions of
the proposed bill. See Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907,
913 (2010).
35
Kay, 359 F.3d at 747 & n.33 (citing Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1029 (6th
Cir. 1990) (stating that the “FCPA was primarily designed to protect the integrity of American
foreign policy and domestic markets”)).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol42/iss2/5

6

Georgis: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

2012]
A.

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

249

ORIGINS OF THE ACT

The FCPA was enacted as a response to rampant unethical corporate
conduct occurring during the 1970s. 36 Based on a number of corporate
corruption scandals discovered during the Watergate era, the SEC
conducted multiple investigations to assess how widespread the misuse
of corporate funds had become. 37 As a result of these investigations, the
SEC and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uncovered several “slush
funds” 38 used by U.S. multinational corporations for the purpose of
bribing foreign government officials to obtain lucrative business
agreements. 39 Congress was troubled by these exchanges because they
were harmful to the U.S. economy while, at the same time, permissible
under federal law. 40 Members of the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs concurred with then-Treasury Secretary W.
Michael Blumenthal’s position that “paying bribes—apart from being
morally repugnant and illegal in most countries—is simply not necessary
for the successful conduct of business here or overseas.” 41 The

36

Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. at 239.
37
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND
URBAN AFFAIRS, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE
PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (May 12, 1976); S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 1-2 (1977) (Conf. Rep.).
38
A “slush fund” is defined as “a fund for bribing public officials” or “an unregulated fund
often used for illicit purposes.” Slush Fund Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/slush%20fund (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
39
See UNLAWFUL CORPORATE PAYMENTS ACT OF 1977: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM.
ON CONSUMER PROT. & FIN. OF THE H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95th Cong.
1-184 (1977); S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 3 (1977) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that SEC report revealed that
over 300 U.S. companies made questionable payments to foreign officials involving hundreds of
millions of dollars); S. REP. NO. 95-114 (1977) (Conf. Rep.) (revealing that U.S. oil companies and
defense contractors made large payments to high-ranking government officials in Japan,
Netherlands, and Italy); see also Scandals: A Record of Corporate Corruption, TIME, Feb. 23, 1976,
available at www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,918067-1,00.html (stating that the SEC
and IRS have exposed voluminous bribes, kickbacks, and political payoffs involving Northrop
Corp., Gulf Oil, 3M Co., Exxon, General Motors, and IBM). In many countries, the idea of making
cash gifts in exchange for government contracts is ingrained in the business culture. Barbara
Crutchfield George, Kathleen A. Lacey & Jutta Birmele, On the Threshold of the Adoption of Global
Antibribery Legislation: A Critical Analysis of Current Domestic and International Efforts Toward
the Reduction of Business Corruption, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 5 (1999). The industries
typically involved in these illicit payments were health care, oil and gas production, food products,
aerospace, airlines and air services, and chemicals. UNLAWFUL CORPORATE PAYMENTS ACT OF
1977: H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95th Cong. 1-184 (1977).
40
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4-5 (1977) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 4
(1977) (Conf. Rep.).
41
S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 4 (1977) (Conf. Rep.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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committee based its agreement with Secretary Blumenthal on the
following:
Many U.S. firms have taken a strong stand against paying foreign
bribes and are still able to compete in international trade.
Unfortunately, the reputation and image of all U.S. businessmen has
been tarnished by the activities of a sizeable number, but by no means
a majority of American firms. A strong antibribery law is urgently
needed to bring these corrupt practices to a halt and to restore public
confidence in the integrity of the American business system. 42

Accordingly, Congress took a bold stance to criminalize behavior it
deemed unethical, regardless of the customs and routine practices of the
foreign country where business took place. 43

42

Id.
UNLAWFUL CORPORATE PAYMENTS ACT OF 1977: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON
CONSUMER PROT. & FIN. OF THE H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95th Cong. 1184 (1977) (“The payment of bribes to influence the acts or decisions of foreign officials, foreign
political parties or candidates for foreign political office is unethical. It is counter to the moral
expectations and values of the American public.”). Transparency International, a German-based
global corruption watchdog group, conducts a global opinion poll aimed at gauging how exposed
respondents’ lives are to a culture of official graft. See 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index,
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (Sept. 22, 2008), www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/
2008/cpi2008. In Korea, a culture of bribery is deeply ingrained in the business community. See
Yoolim Lee, Samsung Bribery Probe Points to Pattern of Graft in South Korea, BLOOMBERG (Apr.
17, 2008, 5:52 PM), www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&refer=home&sid=
aH3aDwXXnvqc. Many label the system as “crony capitalism” and argue that Korea is
fundamentally corrupt. Id. Although illegal, bribery in Korea is socially acceptable and often the
preferred means of conducting business. Id. The same holds true for Albania, Greece, and Japan.
See Tom Zeller Jr., If You’re Thinking of Living in Albania . . . Bring Bribe Money, N.Y. TIMES
BLOG (Dec. 7, 2006 9:17 AM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2006/12/07/if-youre-thinking-ofliving-in-albania-bring-bribe-money/?scp=4&sq=global%20culture%20of%20bribery&st=cse.
Basic services in Albania, such as electricity, even require the payment of a small bribe. Id. In
Greece, a deep reputation of corruption costs Greek citizens $1 billion per year. Near-Bankrupt
Greece a Culture of Corruption; $1 Billion a Year in Bribes, NEW EUROPE (Mar. 7, 2010),
www.neurope.eu/articles/99469.php. Many civil servants, doctors, and lawyers have been found to
evade taxes through the payment of bribes. Id. In Japan, the practice of “Amakudari” runs rampant.
See Hiroko Nakata, “Amakudari” Crackdown Called Toothless, Poll Ploy, THE JAPAN TIMES
ONLINE (Apr. 14, 2007), http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20070414a3.html. “Amakudari” is
the institutionalized practice under which Japanese bureaucrats retire to high-paying public or
private sector positions. Id. The costly corruption fostered in this system allows politicians and
companies to collude on business agreements, ultimately favorable to the politician once hired. Id.
Despite enactment of the Unfair Competition Prevention Law (UCPL), which criminalizes the
bribery of foreign officials, this unethical business practice still occurs. See Tetsuya Morimoto,
OECD Criticized Japan for its Laxness in Implementing the Anti-Bribery Convention, 21 INT’L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 249 (2005). A March 2005 OECD Report that evaluated Japan’s
implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention found that Japan had not made sufficient
efforts to enforce the prohibition against bribing public officials. Id. The lack of investigative and
43
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However, Congress created an exception to prevent U.S. companies
from being disadvantaged where insignificant monetary payments were a
The “facilitating payments” exception permitted
social norm. 44
payments to officials whose duties were considered “clerical” or
“ministerial.” 45 This provision was created under the assumption that
low-level government positions entailed little discretion and that
payments to them were harmless. 46 These payments allowed U.S.
companies to adapt to the cultural norms of the foreign country. 47
Unfortunately, Congress left the terms “clerical” and “ministerial”
undefined, and American businesses were forced to draw their own line
as to how much discretion a government employee needed before falling
outside the exception. 48 After a decade of confusion surrounding the
vague and undefined terms of the Act, Congress provided pivotal
guidance through subsequent amendments. 49
B.

THE 1988 AND 1998 AMENDMENTS TO THE FCPA

The government’s lack of enforcement yielded criticism by many
who later called for clarification and changes to the FCPA. 50 The
growing trade deficit in the United States caused concern among
members of Congress, so modifications to the Act were made in an

prosecutorial resources being devoted to enforcing the UCPL has resulted in no formal
investigations or charges against Japanese corporations. Id.
44
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(2) (1982) (current version at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-2 (Westlaw
2012)).
45
Id. The “facilitating payments” exception was imbedded in the definition of “foreign
official.” Id. The term “foreign official” was defined as “any officer or employee of a foreign
government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or any person acting in an official
capacity for or on behalf of any such government or department, agency, or instrumentality. Such
term does not include any employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or
instrumentality thereof whose duties are essentially ministerial or clerical.” Id. (emphasis added).
46
Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 242 (1997) (stating that illicit payments became a part
of the pay that low-level government employees received because their salaries alone were
inadequate).
47
Id. at 266.
48
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(2) (1982). The only guidance given from the legislature came
from a House Report that distinguished corrupt payments from facilitating payments. See
UNLAWFUL CORPORATE PAYMENTS ACT OF 1977: H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE, 95th Cong. 1-184 (1977). For instance, the bill would not proscribe gratuity payments
to customs officials to speed processing and secure permits or licenses. Id.
49
Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. at 243.
50
Id.
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attempt to eliminate export obstacles facing U.S. companies. 51
Consequently, the FCPA was amended twice, once under the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 52 and again under the
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998. 53
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act was Congress’s initial
attempt to resolve the harsh economic effects of the FCPA. 54 The
principles behind the 1988 amendments were to promote the
participation of U.S. corporations in international trade, to prevent FCPA
violations in international business transactions, and to send a
congressional signal to the executive branch that foreign nations should
also enact anti-corruption laws. 55 To effectuate these principles,
Congress amended and clarified the terms of the FCPA. 56 One of these
amendments altered the scienter requirement for payments made to third
parties. 57 The 1977 version of the FCPA prohibited payments to third
parties that the payor actually knew or had reason to know were for
purposes proscribed by the Act. 58 Because legislators did not want to
impose criminal liability for simple negligence or to encourage the
willful blindness of corrupt third-party payments, Congress sought to
amend the state-of-mind requirement. 59 As a result, the 1988 version of
the Act criminalizes the payment of third-party bribes only if the payor

51

Id.
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -2 (1994)) (enacting the 1988 amendments negotiated between
the House and the Senate).
53
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112
Stat. 3302 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2000)).
54
See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107.
55
Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act—1977 to 2010,
12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 89, 98 (2010). The 1988 amendment recommended that the executive
branch promote global adherence to FCPA policies and request the cooperation of the OECD in
adopting U.S. anti-corruption standards. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. at 248.
56
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107.
57
H.R. REP. NO.100-576, at 919 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547,
1952.
58
Id.; see also Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1107. The original language of the FCPA included both a subjective and objective mens rea
requirement for a third-party bribe. Id. If the company knew or had reason to know that the
payment made to a third-party would be used for purposes of official graft, a violation occurred. Id.
59
H.R. REP. NO.100-576, at 919 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547,
1952; Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107.
52
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has actual knowledge of the intended results or acts with a conscious
disregard for the truth. 60
In addition to this amendment, Congress clarified the “facilitating
payments” exception by setting forth what constitutes an “essentially
ministerial or clerical” duty 61 and added two more defenses to shield
corporations from liability. 62 The Conference Report explained that the
exception applies to “routine governmental action,” defined as
“ordinarily and commonly performed” duties. 63 The 1988 amendment
provided a set of specific examples regarding payments for “routine
governmental action,” including the processing of government papers,
loading and unloading cargo, and scheduling inspections associated with
contract performance. 64 Moreover, Congress created two affirmative
defenses to liability for what would otherwise be illicit payments:
reasonable and bona fide expenditures, 65 and legality in the host
60

H.R. REP. NO.100-576, at 919-21 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1547, 1952. The conferees clarified the conscious-disregard standard as the “deliberate ignorance of
known circumstances that should reasonably alert one to the high probability of violations of the
Act.” Id.; see also Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107. Contra Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. at 244 (contrasting the 1977 scienter requirement, which
required the payor to know or have reason to know that the payments were for the purpose of
influencing or inducing foreign officials to act).
61
See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107. The exception for routine governmental action stated that “[15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)] shall not
apply to any facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official, political party, or party official
the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action by
a foreign official, political party, or party official.” 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b)
(Westlaw 2012).
62
See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107.
63
See id. The conferees make clear that “‘ordinarily and commonly performed’ actions with
respect to permits or licenses would not include those governmental approvals involving an exercise
of discretion by a government official where the actions are the functional equivalent of ‘obtaining
or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person.’” H.R. REP. NO.100-576, at
921 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd2(h)(4)(B) (1994).
64
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107. In
the 1988 amendment, Congress made explicitly clear what “routine governmental action” did not
include. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(B) (1994). “[T]he term ‘routine governmental action’ means
only an action which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official in: (i) obtaining
permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person to do business in a foreign country;
(ii) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders; (iii) providing police protection,
mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling inspections associated with contract performance or
inspections related to transit of goods across country; (iv) providing phone service, power and water
supply, loading and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities from
deterioration; or (v) actions of a similar nature.” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(A) (1994).
65
The “reasonable and bona fide expenditures” defense applies to travel and lodging
expenses associated with the promoting, demonstrating, and explaining of products or services.
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country. 66 These defenses were Congress’s attempt to balance a resolute
opposition to global corporate bribery with the promotion of U.S.
economic interests abroad. 67
A decade after the 1988 amendment, Congress amended the FCPA
a second time. 68 With the encouragement of President Clinton, 69 the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
adopted the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions. 70 Thirty-three member
countries—including the United States—signed the Convention, thereby
agreeing to enact legislation in their respective countries that prohibits
In October 1998, Congress
the bribery of foreign officials. 71
consequently amended federal law to conform to international standards
promulgated by the OECD Convention. 72

Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107; 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 78dd-1(c), 78dd-2(c), 78dd-3(c) (Westlaw 2012).
66
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107.
The legality defense permits a U.S. company to make payments to a foreign official only if the
payments are lawful under the written laws and regulations of the foreign official’s country. Id.; 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(c), 78dd-2(c), 78dd-3(c).
67
See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107 (stating that congressional findings and conclusions include an unnecessary concern by U.S.
companies regarding the scope of the FCPA, and that the principal objectives of the FCPA should be
maintained).
68
See International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366,
112 Stat. 3302.
69
The 1988 Amendment to the FCPA charged the U.S. President with pursuing the
negotiation of an international agreement to govern corporate bribery. See Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107.
70
See OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, OECD, www.oecd.org/document/21/0,3746,en_2649_34859_2017813
_1_1_1_1,00&&en-USS_01DBC.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2012).
71
See William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the International Anti-Bribery and Fair
Competition Act of 1998 (Nov. 10, 1998), available at www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=55254&st=&st1=. As of March 2011, thirty-four OECD countries had signed the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. These countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Czech Republic, Chile, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Israel, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand,
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Switzerland, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom,
United States, and four non-OECD countries (Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and Bulgaria). See
ORG. OF ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN
PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: RATIFICATION STATUS AS OF
MARCH 2009, available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/13/40272933.pdf.
72
See International Anti-Bribery Act of 1998, S. 2375, 105th Cong. § 2 (as passed by House,
Oct. 9, 1998); Id., S. 2375, 105th Cong. § 2 (as passed by Senate, July 31, 1998).
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The 1998 amendment expanded the FCPA’s substantive and
jurisdictional scope. 73 First, Congress broadened the meaning of bribery
to include illicit payments that secure “any improper advantage.” 74
Unlike the prior language of the provision (“influencing [or inducing]
any act or decision of [a] foreign official” 75 ), the new language is much
broader and focuses on the competitive advantage gained, not on the
payor’s intention to influence the official. 76
Second, the 1998
amendment expanded the FCPA’s jurisdiction beyond U.S. borders to
allow for greater enforcement. 77 The alternative jurisdiction provision
functions as a global enforcement mechanism that permits the U.S.
government to prosecute any U.S. national who violates the FCPA, even
if the acts are committed while outside the United States. 78 These
expansions of power subject even more corporate payments to FCPA
enforcement, despite harsh criticism that the statute is vague. 79
After much debate and years of congressional testimony aimed at
clarifying and redefining the scope of the Act, the law consists of two
main kinds of provisions: (1) accounting provisions, 80 and (2) antibribery
provisions. 81 First, the accounting provisions, commonly known as the
“books and records and internal control provisions,” 82 require a publicly
73

Compare International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105366, 112 Stat. 3302, and 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (Westlaw 2012), with Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, and 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(B)
(1994).
74
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112
Stat. 3302.
75
“It shall be unlawful . . . [to give] anything of value to any foreign official for purposes of
(i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity, [or] (ii) inducing
such foreign official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official.” 15
U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(1)(A) (1994).
76
See Cortney C. Thomas, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of Rapid
Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439, 448 (2010). The definition of
“foreign official” was also broadened to include “persons employed by international organizations.”
Id.; see 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-2(h)(2) (Westlaw 2012).
77
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(g), 78dd-2(i) (Westlaw 2012).
78
See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(g), 78dd-2(i); Thomas, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A
Decade of Rapid Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. at 448.
79
See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107 (recognizing the complaints by U.S. corporations that the FCPA is vague).
80
15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b)(2)(A), (B) (Westlaw 2012). The accounting provisions were
intended to detect illicit payments through the disclosure of accurate company records. Barbara
Crutchfield George, Kathleen A. Lacey & Jutta Birmele, On the Threshold of the Adoption of Global
Antibribery Legislation: A Critical Analysis of Current Domestic and International Efforts Toward
the Reduction of Business Corruption, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 5 (1999).
81
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (Westlaw 2012).
82
The books and records and internal controls provisions apply only to entities with
registered classes of securities under securities laws. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b)(2)(A), (B). These
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traded corporation to maintain books and records that “accurately and
fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the
[corporation].” 83 These stringent accounting controls apply only to
entities with registered classes of securities pursuant to federal securities
laws. 84 Second, the antibribery provisions 85 —the operative portions of
the FCPA—prohibit corporations from acquiring foreign business
through under-the-table deals. 86 Because these provisions help federal
agencies collect millions in criminal and civil penalties, 87 and effectively
force U.S. businesses to adopt intricate compliance programs, 88 this
Comment will discuss the antibribery provisions in further detail below.
C.

ANTIBRIBERY PROVISIONS AND THE BUSINESS NEXUS
REQUIREMENT

The antibribery provisions of the FCPA, intended as the primary
enforcement measure in prohibiting foreign bribery, 89 apply to three
groups of actors: (1) issuers, (2) domestic concerns, and (3) any person
who acts in furtherance of the bribery payment while on U.S. territory. 90
First, issuers are both U.S. companies that have securities registered in
the United States, and foreign businesses 91 with shares listed on a U.S.
entities are publicly held companies with shares that trade on U.S. exchanges. Id. The SEC can
impose only civil penalties on a U.S. company unless the company knowingly fails to implement a
system of internal accounting controls. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b)(4), (5) (Westlaw 2012).
83
15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
84
15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b)(2)(A), (B). A publicly held corporation must comply with the
accounting provisions if it has securities registered with the SEC under section 12 of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 or is required to file periodic reports under section 15(d) of the same Act.
Id.; see 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(d) (Westlaw 2012). The SEC is responsible for enforcing the books and
records and internal control provisions. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(a), (b) (Westlaw 2012).
85
In contrast to the accounting controls, the antibribery provisions apply to U.S. companies
(both public and private), U.S. citizens, and any person while in a U.S. territory. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§
78m(b), 78dd-1 to -3 (Westlaw 2012). The DOJ and SEC enforce the antibribery provisions through
the use of criminal and civil penalties. Id.
86
See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (Westlaw 2012).
87
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Magyar Telekom and Deutsche Telekom
Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agree to Pay Nearly $64 Million in
Combined Criminal Penalties (Dec. 29, 2011), available at www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
cases/magyar-telekom/2011-12-29-mt-dt-press-release.pdf (stating that the federal government
recovered more than $95 million in a parallel enforcement action with the SEC).
88
See Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 1001-02
(2010).
89
See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (1977) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098,
4107-08.
90
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1 to -3.
91
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Siemens AG for
Engaging in Worldwide Bribery (Dec. 15, 2008), available at www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-
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stock exchange in the form of American Depository Receipts. 92 Second,
domestic concerns are defined as U.S. citizens or companies
incorporated in the United States. 93 Third, Congress expanded the FCPA
to cover “any person,” usually a foreign national, over whom the DOJ
has jurisdiction. 94 Enforcement actions against issuers and domestic
concerns are more common than actions against foreign nationals. 95
Consequently, when this Comment mentions “actors” it will refer
collectively to issuers and domestic concerns.
The FCPA’s antibribery provisions bind issuers and domestic
concerns even if they act outside the United States. 96 These actors are
prohibited from (i) corruptly 97 making use of interstate commerce in
furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of a
monetary payment, or anything of value (ii) to a foreign official or
foreign political party (iii) in order to “obtain or retain business.” 98
Congress intended the FCPA to be an expansive criminal law,
prohibiting both the actual payment of bribes by corporations and their
agents, as well as attempts to make such bribes. 99 Additionally, the
294.htm (charging Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, a German-based manufacturer, with violating the
FCPA and ordering it to pay $800 million in criminal and civil penalties).
92
See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78l, 78o(d) (Westlaw 2012); 17 C.F.R. § 239.36 (Westlaw
2012).
93
15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-2(h)(1) (Westlaw 2012).
94
15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-3(f)(1) (Westlaw 2012). Any foreign national in the United States
who commits an act in furtherance of a bribe is subject to DOJ and SEC enforcement. Matthew J.
Kovacich, Comment, Backyard Business Going Global: The Consequences of Increased
Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) on Minnesota and Wisconsin, 32
HAMLINE L. REV. 529, 536-37 (2009). U.S. courts have jurisdiction over foreign companies or
persons who make these illegal payments in the United States, even though they are not domiciled in
the United States and do not maintain any place of business in the United States. Wynn Pakdeejit &
Timothy Breier, Continued FCPA Enforcement Sends Clear Message Around the Globe, THE
NATION (Sept. 14, 2010), available at www.nationmultimedia.com/home/2010/09/14/
opinion/Continued-FCPA-enforcement-sends-clear-message-aro-30137919.html. The FCPA defines
the term “person” as “any natural person other than a national of the United States . . . or any
corporation . . . organized under the law of a foreign nation or a political subdivision thereof.” 15
U.S.C.A. § 78dd-3(f)(1).
95
See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2010 YEAR-END FCPA UPDATE (Jan. 3, 2011),
available at www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2010Year-EndFCPAUpdate.aspx.
A
summary of the largest FCPA settlements in history shows that nine out of the ten corporations were
considered “issuers” with shares registered with the SEC or trading on an exchange as an American
Depository Receipt.
96
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-2(i)(1), (2) (Westlaw 2012).
97
The legislative history of the FCPA describes the term “corruptly” in order to make clear
that “the offer, payment, promise, or gift, must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his
official position in order to wrongfully direct business to the payor or his client.” S. REP. NO. 95114, at 10 (1977) (Conf. Rep.).
98
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a) (Westlaw 2012).
99
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a).
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statute prohibits any person from using a third party or intermediary to
consummate the exchange. 100
A successful prosecution under the FCPA requires the DOJ to prove
three core elements. 101 First, the term “anything of value” has been
interpreted to encompass both tangible and intangible benefits to the
individual receiving the value. 102 Second, a “foreign official” is any
officer or employee of a foreign government or public international
organization. 103 Third, the term “to obtain or retain business”—
commonly referred to as the “business nexus requirement”—directs the
government to prove that the illegal payments will assist the company in
acquiring or keeping business. 104 Strictly speaking, “anything of value”
corruptly offered to any “foreign official” must be for one of the
following purposes:
[1] influencing any act or decision of [the] foreign official in his
official capacity; [2] inducing [the] foreign official to do or omit to do
any act in violation of [his] lawful duty . . . ; [3] inducing [the] foreign
official to use his influence with a foreign government . . . to affect or
influence any act or decision of such government . . . ; or [4] securing

100

15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3), 78dd-3(a)(3) (Westlaw 2012) (prohibiting
payment to “any person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be
offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official, to any foreign political
party or official thereof, or to any candidate for foreign political office”).
101
See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a).
102
See Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 914-16
(2010). Congress has not established a minimum value for this element. Id. DOJ enforcement has
ranged from the most egregious cases to the most subtle. In an action against Kellogg Brown &
Root LLC (KBR), corporate officials provided cash-stuffed briefcases or cash-stuffed vehicles to
various Nigerian foreign officials. Id. On the other hand, in an enforcement action brought against
Paradigm B.V., the DOJ considered a “thing of value” as providing employment to a client’s
brother, and leasing a house owned by the client’s wife. Paradigm B.V. Agrees to Pay Penalty to
Resolve Foreign Bribery Issues in Multiple Countries, FCPA ENFORCEMENT (Oct. 2, 2007),
www.fcpaenforcement.com/documents/document_detail.asp?ID=4459&PAGE=2.
103
See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-2(h)(2)(A), (B) (Westlaw 2012). This element is the source of
much criticism of the FCPA. The lack of judicial scrutiny has permitted the DOJ to apply the FCPA
when employees of state-owned corporations receive payments. AGA Medical was forced to pay a
criminal penalty when it made payments to doctors at state-owned hospitals for purchasing AGA
products. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, AGA Medical Corporation Agrees to Pay $2 Million
Penalty and Enter Deferred Prosecution Agreement for FCPA Violations (June 3, 2008), available at
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/June/08-crm-491.html.
104
United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 743 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Stacy Williams, Grey
Areas of FCPA Compliance, 17 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 14, 17 (2008).
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any improper advantage, in order to assist [the payor] in obtaining or
retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person. 105

The connection or “linkage” between the anticipated effects that flow
from these purposes and the payment provided in completion or
expectation of such effects functions as the “nexus” that is at the heart of
the “to obtain or retain business” element. 106
Although these elements are most important, critics have argued
that they are among the most ambiguous. 107 This issue reached the
courts in 2004 when, after applying the principles of statutory
construction, the Fifth Circuit held that the FCPA is ambiguous as a
matter of law and fails to clearly define the scope of the business nexus
Congress’s failure to define the business nexus
requirement. 108
requirement has forced companies to attempt compliance with an
amorphous prohibition. 109 Nonetheless, little guidance has been given as
to the reach of the nexus, 110 and such uncertainty continues to increase
transaction costs for U.S. companies wishing to conduct business
abroad. 111 Many would agree that the most basic form of bribery—a

105

15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1), 78dd-2(a)(1), 78dd-3(a)(1) (Westlaw 2012) (emphasis

added).
106

Kay, 359 F.3d at 744.
See Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. at 916-18; Jeffrey L.
Snyder, International Operations: Managing the Risks, N.Y. L.J., May 20, 1996, available at
www.crowell.com/documents/DOCASSOCFKTYPE_ARTICLES_677.pdf; Mike Koehler, The
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV.
389, 390-93 (2010).
108
Kay, 359 F.3d at 746 (holding that the statutory language is amenable to more than one
interpretation).
109
See Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. at 907-10 (noting the
lack of FCPA case law); see also 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(f), 78dd-2(h), 78dd-3(f) (Westlaw 2012)
(omitting “to obtain or retain business” from defined terms).
110
See, e.g., Stacy Williams, Grey Areas of FCPA Compliance, 17 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE
L.J. 14, 17-18 (2008); Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. at 917-18.
111
See Allen R. Brooks, Comment, A Corporate Catch-22: How Deferred and NonProsecution Agreements Impede the Full Development of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 7 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 137, 155 (2010) (“Statutory clarity is essential to factoring the costs associated with
investment decisions by enabling corporations to accurately consider the costs of complying with the
law.”). For companies wishing to engage in a merger or acquisition, the ambiguity in the FCPA may
have dire consequences for the deal. See Jeffrey L. Snyder, International Operations: Managing the
Risks,
N.Y.
L.J.,
May
20,
1996,
www.crowell.com/documents/
DOCASSOCFKTYPE_ARTICLES_677.pdf. Limiting potential liability demands an increased
scrutiny in premerger due diligence, which entails digging through many of the target company’s
records. Id. If a potential problem appears to be within the purview of the FCPA, the acquiring
company may offset the transaction price. Id. This imposes a considerable cost on the target
company. See id.
107
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suitcase full of cash in exchange for lucrative government contracts 112 —
would undoubtedly be in violation of the FCPA. 113 On the other hand,
some have engaged in business transactions not as blatant as the above
example, yet equally punishable in the eyes of the law. 114 Business’s
inability to interpret the scope of the nexus has caused much
confusion; 115 yet, there appears to be little judicial scrutiny to clear the
air. 116
Given the lack of case law defining the FCPA’s business nexus
requirement, issuers and domestic concerns are faced with the difficult
task of formulating their own interpretation. The scant guidance from
the 1988 and 1998 amendments to the FCPA provide no refuge to those
seeking to avoid liability. 117 Since Congress’s adoption of the Act in
1977, the business nexus requirement has been one of the few provisions
subjected to limited judicial scrutiny.118 However, in the past decade, the
issues confronting corporate officials have only been inflamed. 119

112

See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Willbros Group and
Former
Employees
with
Foreign
Bribery
(May
14,
2008),
available
at
www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-86.htm (charging Willbros Group for violating the FCPA when
it allegedly engaged in a scheme to pay $6 million in bribes to the Nigerian government in exchange
for two significant contracts worth $9 million).
113
United States v. Kozeny, 493 F. Supp. 2d 693 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Information at 12-13,
United States v. BAE Systems plc, No. 10-CR-00035 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2010) (alleging that BAE
wired $9 million to a Swiss bank account with a high degree of awareness that the money would
ultimately be transferred to Saudi Arabian government officials in exchange for their purchase of
military jets); Information at 18, United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, No. 09-CR-00071
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2009) (alleging that $500,000 in cash was put into a vehicle and left in a hotel
parking lot for Nigerian government officials to pick up).
114
See John Gibeaut, Battling Bribery Abroad, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 18, 2007),
www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/battling_bribery_abroad/ (opining that most bribery attempts
are subtle and difficult to detect).
115
See Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. at 1002 (“When the
statute with uncertain terms and defenses is a criminal statute, such as the FCPA, the risk of overcompliance is greatest.”).
116
Id. at 909-10.
117
See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(f), 78dd-2(h), 78dd-3(f) (Westlaw 2012). The amendments to
the FCPA failed to provide any definition or guidance as to what the business nexus requirement
means. See id.
118
Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. at 918.
119
See Stacy Williams, Grey Areas of FCPA Compliance, 17 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J.
14, 18 (2008) (stating that since the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Kay, the DOJ has used a broad
reading of the business nexus requirement); see also supra note 18 and accompanying text (FCPA
enforcement has been trending upward since Kay).
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A BROADENING OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S AUTHORITY TO
PROSECUTE FCPA VIOLATIONS

In 2004, the seminal case addressing the vagueness of the business
nexus requirement came before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. 120 In United States v. Kay, the court considered whether
payments made to Haitian government customs officials for the purpose
of reducing import duties fell within the scope of this element. 121 The
Fifth Circuit held that making payments to a foreign government customs
official to reduce taxes and customs duties can provide an unfair
advantage to the business and thereby assist in “obtaining or retaining
business.” 122
A.

UNITED STATES V. KAY

In Kay, the federal government charged two corporate executives
from American Rice, Inc. (ARI) with bribing customs officials in
Haiti. 123 ARI was a publicly held company that exported rice to foreign
countries, including Haiti. 124 Standard importation procedures in Haiti
required customs officials to assess import duties based on the quantity
and value of rice brought into the country. 125 Additionally, Haiti
required rice importers to pay an advance deposit against Haitian sales
taxes, for which credit would be given when tax returns were filed. 126
In 1999, David Kay, ARI’s vice president of Caribbean Operations,
disclosed in an interview with outside counsel that ARI had taken steps
to reduce its tax liability to the Haitian government. 127 These steps
included underreporting ARI’s imports and paying Haitian officials to
accept false documentation that intentionally understated the amount of

120

See United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 740. The issue presented in Kay was in contrast to the common FCPA scenario,
where a U.S. company would make payments to a “foreign official” in exchange for a government
contract. Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. at 918.
122
Kay, 359 F.3d at 756.
123
Id. at 740.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Michael J. Gilbert & William Gibson, “Kay III” Highlights Reach of FCPA to Payments
Abroad, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 24, 2007, at 4, available at www.dechert.com/library/Gilbert%
20and%20Gibson%2012-2407%20Kay%20III%20Highlights.pdf.
121
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rice shipped to Haiti. 128 Kay explained that this was part of the cost of
doing business in that country. 129
After later self-disclosing the payments to the U.S. government,
Kay and Douglas Murphy, ARI’s president, were indicted and charged
with violating the FCPA. 130 The U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and held that
there was an insufficient nexus between the payments and a specific
contract. 131 Therefore, the court reasoned, the payments to reduce ARI’s
tax liability were outside the scope of the FCPA’s “obtain or retain
business” provision. 132 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and held
that, in addition to payments that directly influenced a government
contract, Congress intended to proscribe a much broader range of
payments. 133 Based on legislative history, the court of appeals ruled that
Congress intended to extend criminal liability to instances where bribes
provide a competitive advantage. 134
As a result of Kay, the DOJ and the SEC are aggressively enforcing
the FCPA. 135 There has been a dramatic increase in prosecutions
involving customs duties and tax payments, or other payments intended
to assist the company in securing government licenses, permits, and

128

Kay, 359 F.3d at 741.
Gilbert & Gibson, “Kay III” Highlights Reach of FCPA to Payments Abroad, N.Y. L.J.,
Dec. 24, 2007, at 4.
130
Id.
131
United States v. Kay, 200 F. Supp. 2d 681, 684, 686 (S.D. Tex. 2002), rev’d, 359 F.3d 738
(5th Cir. 2004).
132
Id.
133
Kay, 359 F.3d at 755-56.
134
Id. at 756.
135
See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2010 YEAR-END FCPA UPDATE (Jan. 3, 2011),
available at www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2010Year-EndFCPAUpdate.aspx; News and
Its Critics: A Tabloid’s Excesses Don’t Tarnish Thousands of Other Journalists, WALL ST. J., July
18, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303661904576451812776293184.html?
mod=djkeyword (“The foreign-bribery law has historically been enforced against companies
attempting to obtain or retain government business. But U.S. officials have been attempting to
extend their enforcement to include any payments that have nothing to do with foreign government
procurement. This includes [the] case [United States v. Kay.]”); Mike Koehler, Archive for the
“U.S. v. Kay” Category, FCPA PROFESSOR, July 19, 2011, www.fcpaprofessor.com/category/u-s-vkay (“During the FCPA’s first 20 years, every FCPA enforcement action concerned allegations that
payments to a ‘foreign official’ assisted the payor in ‘obtaining or retaining business’ with a foreign
government or alleged foreign government ‘department, agency, or instrumentality.’ FCPA
enforcement then changed—most notably with the U.S. v. Kay prosecution.”). FCPA enforcement
actions in 2010 rose 85% over actions in 2009. GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2010 YEAR-END
FCPA UPDATE (Jan. 3, 2011), available at www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2010YearEndFCPAUpdate.aspx. Many of the investigations and prosecutions in 2010 involved multiple
defendant cases with industry-wide bribery. Id. As a result, the DOJ brought forty-eight actions and
recovered more than $1 billion in penalties. Id.
129
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certifications. 136 However, the Fifth Circuit’s broadening of the business
nexus requirement contravenes Congress’s attempt to carefully balance
the ban of foreign bribery payments with a corporation’s ability to
remain competitive in the global market.
B.

THE KAY INTERPRETATION DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FCPA’S
PURPOSE

The majority of the Kay opinion focused on congressional intent at
the time the bribery law was drafted. 137 The Fifth Circuit agreed with the
district court that, because the statutory provisions are subject to multiple
reasonable interpretations, the text of the FCPA is ambiguous. 138 While
parsing the legislative history, the court discovered that widespread
bribery was causing foreign policy problems in the United States, 139
because corporate graft prompts foreign officials to abuse their authority,
inevitably leading to the disruption of market efficiency and foreign
relations. 140 The proposed Senate version of the bill banned payments
intended to induce foreign officials to “act so as to direct business to any
person, maintain an established business opportunity with any person,
[or] divert any business opportunity from any person.” 141 Given the
pervasiveness of foreign bribery at the time the bill became law, the Fifth
Circuit believed that federal legislators took a broad position to

136

See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 1, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Nature’s Sunshine Prods., Inc., No.
2:09-CV-00672 (D. Utah July 31, 2009), available at www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/
comp21162.pdf (paying Brazilian customs agents to import unregistered company products into
Brazil); Complaint ¶ 9, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Con-Way Inc., No. 1:08-CV-01478 (D.D.C. Aug.
27, 2008), available at www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp20690.pdf (paying officials at
the Philippines Bureau of Customs to allow the freight company to store shipments longer than
otherwise permitted, and to settle company disputes with the Customs Bureau); Information at 9-10,
United States v. Vetco Gray Controls, Inc., No. 4:07-CR-00004 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2007), available
at www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/vetco-controls/02-06-07vetcogray-info.pdf (payments
to Nigerian Customs Officials to provide preferential treatment in the customs clearance process
with respect to the importation of goods into Nigeria).
137
See Kay, 359 F.3d at 742-56.
138
Id. at 743-44. The lack of clarity in the antibribery provisions of the FCPA cannot support
a finding that subtle forms of bribery are within the purview of the Act. Id. Although the statute has
not been ruled void for vagueness, the Fifth Circuit and the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas agreed that the plain language of the text would lead reasonable minds to differ as
to its interpretation. See id. at 743-44; United States v. Kay, 200 F. Supp. 2d 681, 683 (S.D. Tex.
2002), rev’d on other grounds, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004).
139
Kay, 359 F.3d at 746.
140
Id.
141
Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 17 (1977) (Conf. Rep.)) (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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criminalize all forms of bribery. 142 The court also referenced a 1988
House Conference Report that stated that the “obtain or retain business”
language was not limited to the renewal of government contracts, but
included payments made for the purpose of obtaining favorable tax
treatment. 143
Although this language in the 1988 House Report concerning
“favorable tax treatment” would appear to shed light on the prohibitions
covered, Congress decided to leave the business nexus requirement
unchanged in both of the subsequent amendments. 144 The failure to
include the relevant tax language in the text of the statute evidences the
legislature’s inability to garner bicameral support for inclusion in the
agreed-upon amendment. 145 Notwithstanding the lack of any formal
change to the nexus requirement through the legislative process, the Fifth
Circuit found the tax language relevant in defining the scope of the
FCPA. 146 While doing so, the court cited Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC 147 for the proposition that “‘[s]ubsequent legislation declaring the
intent of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory
construction.’” 148
However, in discussing Red Lion Broadcasting, the U.S. Supreme
Court explicitly stated that “[a] mere statement in a conference report of
such legislation as to what the Committee believe[d] an earlier statute
meant is obviously less weighty.” 149 The guidance in Red Lion
Broadcasting hinged on the existence of formally enacted legislation due

142

Id. at 749; see also United States v. Kozeny, 493 F. Supp. 2d 693, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(finding that Congress intended the FCPA’s business nexus requirement to be construed broadly).
143
Kay, 359 F.3d at 751 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 918-19 (1988) (Conf. Rep.)). The
Fifth Circuit found persuasive the House Conference Report that accompanied the 1988 amendment
to the FCPA. Id. That Report stated that the business nexus requirement was “not limited to the
renewal of contracts or other business, but also includes a prohibition against corrupt payments
related to the execution or performance of contracts or the carrying out of existing business, such as
a payment to a foreign official for the purpose of obtaining more favorable tax treatment.” Id.
144
Although Congress amended a number of provisions in 1988, it refused to make any
formal changes to the “obtain or retain business” element. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a)
(1994).
145
See generally Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1107.
146
The court believed that Congress’s attempt to narrowly define the exceptions and
affirmative defenses, against a backdrop of broad applicability, authorized the FCPA to apply to
payments that indirectly assist in obtaining business. Kay, 359 F.3d at 756.
147
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
148
Kay, 359 F.3d at 752 (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969))
(emphasis added).
149
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117-18 n.13 (1980)
(discussing the Red Lion Broadcasting proposition cited by the Fifth Circuit) (emphasis added).
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to the rigorous bicameral process. 150 Moreover, the Court noted that
subsequent legislative history of a less formal type serves as an
“extremely hazardous basis for inferring” congressional intent. 151
Despite the Supreme Court’s position with respect to subsequent
legislative history, the Fifth Circuit heavily relied on the same type of
conference report that—according to the Court—typically would not be
very “weighty.” 152 This reliance on the 1988 House Report was
important to the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Kay that payments, which
indirectly “obtain or retain business,” fall within the scope of the
FCPA. 153
Furthermore, Kay interpreted government reports that highlighted
the SEC investigation when evaluating the breadth of the nexus. 154 The
SEC report issued in 1976 identified four types of illegal payments made
by U.S. companies: (1) payments made to secure an advantage in the
administration of foreign tax laws, (2) payments made for the purpose of
obtaining or retaining government contracts, (3) payments to a low-level

150

Id. (“Petitioners invoke the maxim that states: ‘Subsequent legislation declaring the intent
of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory construction.’ With respect to subsequent
legislation, however, Congress has proceeded formally through the legislative process.” (emphasis in
original)).
151
Id.
152
Kay, 359 F.3d at 752; Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 447 U.S. at 117-18 n.13. The Fifth
Circuit justified its reliance on the conference report by noting that, “The amendments Congress
passed in 1988 . . . expressly sought to clarify Congress’s intent from 1977. Thus, the views and
amendments of Congress in 1988 are necessary to our analysis of the precise scope of the original
law.” Kay, 359 F.3d at 752 n.53. But see the Supreme Court’s caution to lower courts in using
statements in a subsequent conference report to determine the meaning of a statute:
A mere statement in a conference report of such legislation as to what the Committee
believes an earlier statute meant is obviously less weighty.
The less formal types of subsequent legislative history provide an extremely hazardous
basis for inferring the meaning of a congressional enactment. While such history is
sometimes considered relevant, this is because, as Mr. Chief Justice Marshall stated in United
States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386 (1805): “Where the mind labours to discover the design
of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be derived.” See Andrus v. Shell
Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 n.8 (1980). Such history does not bear strong indicia of
reliability, however, because as time passes memories fade and a person’s perception of his
earlier intention may change. Thus, even when it would otherwise be useful, subsequent
legislative history will rarely override a reasonable interpretation of a statute that can be
gleaned from its language and legislative history prior to its enactment.
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 447 U.S. at 117-18 n.13 (holding that a congressional member’s
remarks during a 1976 committee hearing regarding a section of federal law enacted in 1972, are not
entitled to much weight where the member was not a sponsor of the original legislation).
153
See id. at 752 (stating that Congress’s views and amendments in 1988 are necessary to
analyze the scope of the FCPA’s business nexus requirement); H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 918-19
(1988) (Conf. Rep.).
154
See id. at 747-49.
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official to expedite the responsibility, and (4) political contributions.155
The government has explicitly criminalized the second and fourth
categories, yet permitted the third. 156 With respect to the first category,
Kay noted that Congress intended to incorporate payments that
contravened foreign tax laws (i.e. the first category) into the business
nexus requirement. 157 In doing so, the court emphasized the different
terms used in the SEC report (“government contracts”) 158 and in the
enacted law (“business”). 159 When examining the legislature’s intent in
using different terms, the court determined that obtaining or retaining
business was meant to be much broader and include payments made for
government contracts. 160 Because this intent was so broad, the court
notes, payments made to affect the administration of foreign tax laws fall
within the purview of business nexus requirement. 161
However, this interpretation does not take into consideration one of
the most dramatic bribery schemes that took place in the 1970s. In an
infamous scandal, corporate officials of United Brands Company 162 paid
$1.25 million to Honduran President Oswaldo Arellano in an effort to
reduce the export tax on bananas. 163 Once this bribery was uncovered, a
Honduran coup overthrew the government, and United Brands became
known as one of the most far-reaching bribery scandals at the time. 164
Congress was well aware of the details involving United Brands, 165 yet

155

Id. at 747-48.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(2) (1982) (defining the term “foreign official” to exclude
government officials whose duties were clerical or ministerial).
157
Kay, 359 F.3d at 748.
158
The SEC report issued in 1976 only spoke of payments made for the purpose of “obtaining
or retaining government contracts.” Id. at 747-48.
159
The FCPA as originally enacted referred to payments made for the purpose of obtaining or
retaining business. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (1982). Cf. supra note 158 and accompanying text.
160
Kay, 359 F.3d at 748.
161
Id. at 748-49 (“[T]he concern of Congress with the immorality, inefficiency, and unethical
character of bribery presumably does not vanish simply because the tainted payments are intended to
secure a favorable decision less significant than winning a contract bid.”).
162
United Brands Company was a fruit exporting business that imported bananas from
Honduras into the United States. The company later changed its name and is currently known as
Chiquita Brands International, Inc. 100 Years and Counting, CHIQUITA, www.chiquitabrands.com/
companyinfo/History.aspx (last visited Jan. 9, 2012).
163
Honduras: A Genuine Banana Coup, TIME, May 5, 1975, available at
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,913028,00.html?promoid=googlep.
164
Scandals: A Record of Corporate Corruption, TIME, Feb. 23, 1976, available at
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,918067-1,00.html.
165
See Alejandro Posadas, Combating Corruption Under International Law, 10 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 345, 349-50 (2000). The SEC initiated an investigation of United Brands Co.
after its then-Chairman, Eli M. Black, threw himself out of the twenty-second floor of a New York
City building. Id. The investigation uncovered the bribery payments made to President Arellano,
156
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there was no mention of “favorable tax treatment” in the FCPA’s text or
legislative history, as originally enacted. 166 In fact, congressional
hearings were held in the context of illicit payments being made as a
quid pro quo for new business or continuation of ongoing business. 167
Many courts have applied the principle that “obtaining or retaining
business” relates to the buying and selling of goods, acquiring or
retaining government contracts, or other similar situations in which a
business agreement would not have existed absent the payment. 168 In
cases where the existence of a business relationship between the host
country and the U.S. entity is not dependent on the payment of money,
application of the FCPA is inappropriate and not what the statute was
intended to criminalize.
The Fifth Circuit’s holding that the FCPA applies “broadly to
payments intended to assist the payor, either directly or indirectly, in
obtaining or retaining business” 169 opens the door for the U.S.
government to prosecute much less egregious behavior under the same
statute. Although U.S. businesses may hope that future judicial scrutiny
will realign the business nexus interpretation with congressional intent,
the U.S. government has turned that hope into an unattainable dream.
The use of diversion agreements to resolve alleged FCPA violations
prevents these cases from ever reaching court dockets and provides little
incentive for businesses to vigorously defend their conduct.

and on April 9, 1975, the SEC charged United Brands with securities fraud for failing to report the
payment. Id.
166
See S. REP. NO. 95-114 (1977) (Conf. Rep.).
167
See id. at 4; H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4-5 (1977) (Conf. Rep.) (committee hearings
regarding the FCPA were held against the backdrop of an SEC report issued in 1976 detailing
hundreds of multinational corporations bribing foreign government officials to assist the
corporations in gaining business). The majority of bribery cases that Congress investigated when it
enacted the FCPA involved government contracts. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT TO THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT
ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (May 12, 1976); S. REP.
NO. 95-114, at 1-2 (1977) (Conf. Rep.).
168
See, e.g., United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 832-33 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (bus
company made a payment to Saskatchewan government in return for a contract); Envtl. Tectonics v.
W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988) (payment to Nigerian government to influence
award of a Nigerian defense contract); Petroleos Mexicanos v. Crawford Enters., Inc., 826 F.2d 392
(5th Cir. 1987) (payments made to the national oil company of Mexico in order to acquire several
multi-million-dollar equipment contracts); United States v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 741 F. Supp.
334 (D. Conn. 1990) (payments made to officials of the Jamaica Tourist Board to retain advertising
contract).
169
United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 755 (5th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
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III. THE USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS
For the first twenty-five years of the FCPA, the DOJ brought only
fifteen cases against citizens and corporations. 170 Since the Kay decision
in 2004, the U.S. government has aggressively stepped up enforcement
and is collecting millions in civil and criminal penalties. 171 However, the
term “enforcement” does not mean that prosecutors are obtaining
criminal convictions or even indictments; in fact, these cases rarely make
it to trial. 172 DOJ prosecutors are instead opting for deferred prosecution
agreements (DPA) and non-prosecution agreements (NPA) (collectively
known as “diversion agreements”) in an effort to bypass costly litigation
in favor of alternative dispute resolution. 173 Accordingly, the U.S.
government’s forceful engagement in DPAs and NPAs has created a
system that encourages prosecutorial abuse and deters corporate behavior
originally intended by Congress in 1977 to be permissible. 174

170

Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act—1977 to 2010,
12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 89, 102 (2010).
171
Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly
Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 540 (2011) (“The apparent
broadening [in United States v. Kay] of the business purpose element ‘energized’ enforcement
agencies and contributed to ‘an explosion in FCPA enforcement actions’ relating to customs duties
and tax payments.”); Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 918
(2010); Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act—1977 to 2010, 12 SAN
DIEGO INT’L L.J. at 104-06 (noting that in 2010, ABB Ltd, a Swiss engineering company, paid $39
million in civil and $19 million in criminal fines).
172
Thomas Fox, 2009—The Year of the Trial, FCPA COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS BLOG (Dec.
31, 2009, 12:37 AM), http://tfoxlaw.wordpress.com/tag/frederick-bourke/.
173
Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. at 932-33. A 2005 report
released by the Corporate Crime Reporter found that from 2002 to 2005, prosecutors entered into
twice as many DPA and NPAs with large business institutions than during the previous ten years.
CORPORATE CRIME REPORTER, CRIME WITHOUT CONVICTION: THE RISE OF DEFERRED AND NON
PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (Dec. 28, 2005), available at www.corporatecrimereporter.com/
deferredreport.htm. Among the many, these companies include Aetna, Bank of New York, Hilfiger,
Merrill Lynch, Salomon Brothers, Shell Oil, American International Group, KPMG, and PNC
Financial. Id.
174
Compare H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4-5 (1977) (Conf. Rep.) (creating the “facilitating
payments” exception to allow corporate payments to receive favorable treatment from low-level
officials), and H.R. REP. NO. 100-576 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547,
1954 (discussing amendment of the “facilitating payments” exception to include a list of discrete
examples where payments for “routine governmental action” would not apply), with Complaint ¶ 1,
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Nature’s Sunshine Prods., Inc., No. 2:09-CV-00672 (D. Utah July 31,
2009), available at www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/comp21162.pdf (paying Brazilian
customs agents to import unregistered company products into Brazil), and Information at 9-10,
United States v. Vetco Gray Controls, Inc., No. 4:07-CR-00004 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2007), available
at www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/vetco-controls/02-06-07vetcogray-info.pdf (payments
to Nigerian Customs Officials to provide preferential treatment in the customs clearance process
with respect to the importation of goods into Nigeria).
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DIVERSION AGREEMENTS DEFINED

In recent years, the DOJ and the SEC have used diversion
agreements as a means of holding businesses criminally and civilly liable
without entering the courtroom. 175 These agreements are often the
preferred method of resolving a dispute because of the dire consequences
a formal indictment would have on the company’s business. 176 The U.S.
Attorneys’ Manual (“Manual”) states that the primary objectives of
diversion agreements are
[1] To prevent future criminal activity among certain offenders by
diverting them from traditional processing into community
supervision and services. [2] To save prosecutive and judicial
resources for concentration on major cases. [3] To provide, where
appropriate, a vehicle for restitution to communities and victims of
crime. 177

Although the Manual was written in the context of diverting the
prosecution of an individual, the government has extended the scope of
these agreements to cover corporations. 178
DPAs and NPAs are privately negotiated contracts between
government enforcement agencies and U.S. corporations. 179 In an NPA,
the government agrees to postpone indictment for a specified period of
time so long as the corporation satisfies compliance and pecuniary

175

Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. at 932-33. In 1992, the
DOJ and SEC entered into their first corporate NPA with Salomon Brothers for violating federal
antitrust and securities laws. Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution
Deferred? Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1863, 1863-65 (2005).
176
See 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2 (Westlaw 2012). Indictment of a U.S. corporation can cause a
debarment or suspension of government contracts or subcontracts. Id.
177
EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-22.010,
available at www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/22mcrm.htm (last visited
Jan. 9, 2012).
178
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ABB Ltd and Two Subsidiaries Resolve
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Will Pay $19 Million in Criminal Penalties (Sept.
29, 2010), available at www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/September/10-crm-1096.html (stating that
ABB Ltd entered into a DPA with the DOJ and agreed to pay $19 million in criminal and $38
million in civil penalties for paying $1.9 million in bribes to Mexican state-owned utility officials).
179
See, e.g., Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Div., Fraud Section, to Edward J.
Fuhr, Attorney for Alliance One International, Inc. (Aug. 6, 2010), available at
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alliance-one/08-06-10alliance-one-npa.pdf
(memorializing non-prosecution agreement); Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. UBS
AG,
No.
09-60033-CR-COHN
(S.D.
Fla.
Feb.
18,
2009),
available
at
www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=f25be713-a4c8-4685-80b0-9a8579ed228a.
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measures. 180 The agreement states the simple facts, legal conclusions, an
acknowledgment of responsibility, and a detailed compliance program
that the corporation agrees to implement. 181 In contrast, a DPA defers
the prosecution of an already indicted defendant; 182 the agreement is
filed with the court and contains a short statement of facts along with
legal conclusions and an acknowledgment of responsibility. 183 Because
of these diversion agreements, FCPA cases are rarely litigated;
corporations would rather pay a penalty and implement compliance
programs than engage in costly legal action. 184 The U.S. government’s
use of DPAs and NPAs has therefore impaled corporations with a
“Morton’s Fork” 185 and fostered an environment in which prosecutors
abuse their discretion. 186
B.

KAY ENCOURAGES PROSECUTORIAL ABUSE

The guiding principles underlying a prosecutor’s decision to charge
have evolved in the last decade. 187 The DOJ’s issuance of four key
memoranda has provided prosecutors with formal guidance—albeit
broad—with respect to corporate enforcement. 188 These memos have not

180

See, e.g., Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Div., Fraud Section, to Edward J.
Fuhr, Attorney for Alliance One International, Inc. (Aug. 6, 2010), available at
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alliance-one/08-06-10alliance-one-npa.pdf.
181
See, e.g., id.
182
See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-60033-CRCOHN (S.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2009), available at www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?
fid=f25be713-a4c8-4685-80b0-9a8579ed228a.
183
See, e.g., id.
184
See John Gibeaut, Battling Bribery Abroad, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 18, 2007),
www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/battling_bribery_abroad/.
185
A “Morton’s Fork” is defined as “a dilemma, especially one in which both choices are
equally
undesirable.”
Morton’s
Fork
Definition,
OXFORD
DICTIONARIES,
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/Morton%27s+Fork (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
186
See Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 971-75
(2010) (criticizing a number of government prosecutions where the alleged illegal payments
appeared attenuated for any specific nexus required under the Act).
187
Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), available at www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/
corporate_guidelines.htm; Memorandum from The Deputy Attorney Gen., Bringing Criminal
Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), available at http://federalevidence.com/pdf/2008/06June/Holder1999BringingCrimCharges.pdf.
188
Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial
Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1863 (2005)
(“Federal prosecutors have extended deferred prosecution to corporations amidst the recent wave of
corporate crime . . . .”); see also Memorandum from The Deputy Attorney Gen., Bringing Criminal
Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), available at http://federalevidence.com/pdf/2008/06June/Holder1999BringingCrimCharges.pdf; Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy
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only precipitated the use of DPAs and NPAs, but have also served as the
foundation for the government to broadly interpret the FCPA without
interference from the judiciary. 189
Beginning in 1999, the U.S. Department of Justice has taken various
positions regarding its use of diversion agreements for corporate
defendants. Initially, Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder circulated an
internal memorandum (“Holder Memo”) that provided eight factors to
consider in deciding whether to indict a corporation. 190 The Holder
Memo does not mention a prosecutorial preference for engaging in
diversion agreements, but instead emphasizes how criminal prosecutions
provide deterrence on a “massive scale.” 191 Four years later, Deputy
Attorney General Larry Thompson issued a different memorandum that
made two significant changes to its predecessor. 192 First, the document
mandated that prosecutors weigh the factors in every federal corporate
charge. 193 Second, prosecutors were permitted to grant corporate
immunity or engage in diversion agreements. 194
The third memorandum, issued in December 2006 by Deputy
Attorney General Paul McNulty, established a procedure that required
prosecutors to obtain approval from Justice officials in Washington,
D.C., when a waiver was sought for a corporation’s attorney-client and

Attorney Gen., Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003),
available at www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm.
189
See Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. at 907 (stating that
diversion agreements not subject to judicial scrutiny are typically used to resolve an FCPA
enforcement and are directly related to the absence of FCPA case law).
190
Memorandum from The Deputy Attorney Gen., Bringing Criminal Charges Against
Corporations (June 16, 1999), available at http://federalevidence.com/pdf/2008/06June/Holder1999BringingCrimCharges.pdf. The eight factors articulated by the Deputy Attorney
General are (1) the nature and seriousness of the offense; (2) the pervasiveness of wrongdoing in the
corporation; (3) whether the corporation has a history of similar conduct; (4) the timely and
voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing; (5) the adequacy of the corporate compliance program; (6) the
corporation’s remedial actions, including efforts to correct illegal behavior; (7) collateral
consequences to shareholders and employees; and (8) the adequacy of non-criminal enforcement.
Id.
191
Id.
192
See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), available at www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/
corporate_guidelines.htm.
193
Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, The Power of the Corporate Charging Decision
over Corporate Conduct, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 306, 308 (2007), available at
www.yalelawjournal.com/images/pdfs/529.pdf.
194
Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), available at www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/
corporate_guidelines.htm.
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work-product privileges. 195 Such a waiver provides prosecutors with
significant leverage in being able to obtain the information they want
when determining whether to defer prosecution. Although this course of
conduct was reversed in a subsequent memorandum issued by Deputy
Attorney General Mark Filip, many believe that prosecutors continue to
retain broad discretion in compelling privilege waivers because a
corporation may still waive privileges if it “voluntarily chooses to do
so.” 196 As a result of these memoranda, the use of DPAs and NPAs to
resolve corporate crimes has escalated toward forgoing litigation and
opting for massive agreed-upon penalties.
The discretionary authority high-ranking Justice officials give to
prosecutors facilitates a broad interpretation of the business nexus
requirement, thereby leading to abuse. The DOJ expressly states that it
“interprets ‘obtaining or retaining business’ broadly, such that the term
encompasses more than the mere award or renewal of a contract.”197
Keeping this announced interpretation in mind, the question now
becomes, How much more does the term encompass? Given the lack of
any clear answer to this question, businesses can only speculate as to the
scope of this element by conducting a retrospective analysis of existing
diversion agreements. 198
At a time when the DOJ expresses a clear policy of increased
enforcement in white-collar crime, 199 corporations are rushing to

195

Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006), available at www.justice.gov/dag/
speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf.
196
See, e.g., Mark L. Rotert & Bradley E. Lerman, New Ethical Challenges in Internal
Investigations, 1745 PLI/CORP 857, 862-63 (2009) (“[T]he Filip Memo says to corporations, we will
decide whether and to what extent you have been cooperative by measuring the quality and quantity
of the evidence you bring to us. Because corporations have this incentive to produce a
comprehensive account of the findings of their internal investigations, the corporation has as much
incentive as before to waive its privileges.”); see also Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy
Attorney Gen., Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Aug. 28, 2008),
available at www.justice.gov/dag/readingroom/dag-memo-08282008.pdf (“[W]hile a corporation
remains free to convey non-factual or ‘core’ attorney-client communications or work product—if
and only if the corporation voluntarily chooses to do so—prosecutors should not ask for such
waivers and are directed not to do so.”).
197
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: ANTIBRIBERY PROVISIONS
(LAY-PERSON’S GUIDE), www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-persons-guide.pdf (last
visited Jan. 10, 2012).
198
See Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 998 (2010)
(stating that privately negotiated settlements serve as de facto case law even though they are subject
to little or no judicial scrutiny).
199
Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer, Address at the 24th National Conference on
the
Foreign
Corrupt
Practices
Act
(Nov.
16,
2010),
available
at
www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2010/crm-speech-101116.html.
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cooperate in order to avoid criminal liability. 200 Once the government
becomes suspicious of wrongdoing, a company is subjected to the will of
the government because of the immense damage that an indictment can
inflict on a corporation’s social image and existing business
agreements. 201 Central to a decision of whether to settle is a cost
analysis: if the cost of litigation—which includes the value of lost
business and intangible harm to the corporation’s social image—is
greater than the cost of paying fines and implementing compliance
programs, then entering into a diversion agreement most efficiently
resolves the dispute and quietly allows the corporation to continue with
its business. 202 The potential harm to corporate shareholders and longterm growth also plays a role in the company’s willingness to go along
with the DOJ’s aggressive interpretation of “obtaining or retaining
business.” 203

200

See John Gibeaut, Battling Bribery Abroad, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 18, 2007),
www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/battling_bribery_abroad/. For businesses accused of FCPA
violations, staying in business is more important than going to court and creating precedent. Id. As
a result, they will cooperate with the government and enter into diversion agreements rather than risk
potentially ruinous consequences. Id.
201
See Richard A. Epstein, The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2006,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116468395737834160.html; Benjamin M. Greenblum,
Note, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred
Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1884-86 (2005); Corporate Crime Reporter,
Interview with David Pitofsky, 19 CORP. CRIME REP. 46(8) (2005), available at
www.corporatecrimereporter.com/pitofskyinterview010806.htm (noting that immediately following
the announcement of a criminal investigation, a company typically loses half its market value). In
arguing that the use of DPAs unduly punishes corporations, Richard A. Epstein states that
filing an indictment triggers huge collateral repercussions sufficient to drive the firm out of
business, as teams of state and federal regulators are now duty-bound to suspend the licenses
and permits under which the corporation does business. Thus, the corporation that has strong
protections against false convictions—proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of
the crime, the ability to examine evidence or cross-examine witnesses—is helpless to protect
itself. A conviction carries at most a million-dollar fine, but simple indictment, which lies
wholly within the prosecutor’s discretion, imposes multibillion-dollar losses.
Epstein, The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2006. Furthermore, a corporate
indictment can trigger debarment or suspension from eligibility for government contracts. See 48
C.F.R. § 9.406-2(a) (Westlaw 2012).
202
See John Gibeaut, Battling Bribery Abroad, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 18, 2007),
www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/battling_bribery_abroad/ (“Staying in business is more
important than setting precedent to most companies, so they typically plead guilty or settle with the
government rather than risk the potentially ruinous consequences of going to trial. The dearth of
case law and widening intolerance of bribery can turn compliance into an international game of pin
the tail on the donkey. ‘As a lawyer, I expect laws to be readily transparent and easily
predictable’ . . . . ‘The FCPA is neither.’” (quoting attorney Alexandra A. Wrage)).
203
See David Voreacos, Swiss Shipper Finds Resistance Futile in U.S. Bribery Probe,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 12, 2010), www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-12/swiss-shipper-panalpinafinds-resistance-is-futile-in-u-s-bribery-probe.html (“No company has risked an FCPA court fight in
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Such a willingness to settle has only been exacerbated by the
absence of judicial oversight in the negotiation of diversion agreements.
Although the Speedy Trial Act grants the judiciary approval rights for
DPAs, 204 a Government Accountability Office report found judicial
scrutiny of these agreements to be nonexistent. 205 In fact, every NPA
and DPA that the government negotiated with a U.S. company has been
approved without judicial modification. 206 Accordingly, prosecutors
have replaced judges in the existing adjudicative system, effectively
stripping companies of any bargaining power during the negotiation
process. 207 David Pitofsky, former Principal Deputy Chief of the
Criminal Division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, stated that companies
have no say in defining the terms of a diversion agreement because of the
government’s averseness to negotiation and its propensity to quickly
withdraw from a settlement. 208 Operating unconstrained, the government
is able to dictate the terms of the agreement without review by the courts.
This tremendous power allows the DOJ and the SEC to collect
FCPA penalties based on their sole interpretation of the Act. 209 By
engaging in diversion agreements and interpreting the business nexus
requirement to include payments that indirectly “obtain or retain
business,” the DOJ brands corporations and their executives as criminal
without having to satisfy strict criminal law standards. 210 The broad
two decades out of fear that a conviction could lead to a loss of public contracts and higher penalties,
lawyers said. After resolving two or three cases a year, the U.S. settled 47 corporate cases since
2005 without trial, reaping $3.3 billion for the U.S. treasury.”).
204
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(h)(2) (Westlaw 2012) (“The following periods of delay shall be
excluded in computing the time within which an information or an indictment must be filed, or in
computing the time within which the trial of any such offense must commence: . . . . (2) Any period
of delay during which prosecution is deferred by the attorney for the Government pursuant to written
agreement with the defendant, with the approval of the court, for the purpose of allowing the
defendant to demonstrate his good conduct.”).
205
Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 935 (2010).
206
Id. at 936.
207
See id. at 937; Richard A. Epstein, The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J., Nov.
28, 2006, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116468395737834160.html.
208
Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. at 937.
209
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ABB Ltd and Two Subsidiaries Resolve
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Will Pay $19 Million in Criminal Penalties (Sept.
29, 2010), available at www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/September/10-crm-1096.html (stating that
ABB Ltd entered into a DPA with the DOJ and agreed to pay $19 million in criminal and $38
million in civil penalties for paying $1.9 million in bribes to Mexican state-owned utility officials).
210
See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2010 YEAR-END UPDATE ON CORPORATE
DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (Jan. 4, 2011), available at
www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2010Year-EndUpdateCorporateDeferredProsecutionAndNon-ProsecutionAgreements.pdf (“[B]ecause FCPA allegations
against corporations rarely, if ever, go to trial, and DPAs and NPAs are subject only to minimal
judicial scrutiny, the DOJ’s sometime expansive interpretations of the FCPA [are] never truly
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discretion given to prosecutors under the Deputy Attorney Generals’
memoranda, combined with the shift in DOJ policy to combat corporate
bribery, locks companies into diversion agreements. An absence of
judicial scrutiny of DPAs and NPAs allows the DOJ to command the
outcome of any negotiation and ultimately creates an illusion of choice
whereby businesses end up adopting government-stamped settlement
agreements. 211 In order to create more certainty in the corporate arena
and to discourage an environment that fosters prosecutorial abuse, the
courts must become involved.
IV. SOLUTION: JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
Despite Congress’s renewed efforts in holding committee hearings
regarding the FCPA, 212 legislative gridlock and scant approval ratings
make it unlikely that congressional members will address criticisms.213
Nonetheless, judicial intervention in the enforcement of diversion
agreements is available to alleviate some of the challenges that exist in
this environment. In particular, corporations would finally be given
guidance as to how vague FCPA provisions—for example, the business
nexus requirement—will be construed by the courts. Such a solution
would help to clearly demarcate the line between lawful and unlawful
conduct, providing some certainty in FCPA compliance and

tested.”); Epstein, The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2006 (stating that a DPA
undermines the separation of powers by eroding the protections of criminal law and turning the
prosecutor into a judge).
211
See David Voreacos, Swiss Shipper Finds Resistance Futile in U.S. Bribery Probe,
BLOOMBERG, Nov. 12, 2010, www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-12/swiss-shipper-panalpinafinds-resistance-is-futile-in-u-s-bribery-probe.html; see also Joe Palazzolo, Corporate News: FCPA
Settlements Can Become Costly Burdens, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2011, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204618704576641414241674164.html (stating that
corporations would rather forgo government prosecution in exchange for a long and costly
settlement process that will require years of government supervision and millions to implement);
Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 781, 825 (2011)
(“Commentators suggest that a climate where firms feel they must accept DPAs and NPAs embolden
the DOJ and SEC to advance broad and vague theories of FCPA liability that rarely, if ever, receive
judicial scrutiny.”).
212
Thomas O. Gorman, FCPA Enforcement: Crafting Incentives to Foster Compliance, SEC
ACTIONS BLOG (Dec. 2, 2010, 4:48 AM), www.secactions.com/?p=2839 (“Hearings before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs, on November 30, 2010 considered
testimony about FCPA enforcement and possible reform.”).
213
Ashley Portero, Congress’ Approval Rating Reaches New Low at 10%: Gallup, INT’L BUS.
TIMES (Feb. 9, 2012, 3:27 PM), www.ibtimes.com/articles/296136/20120209/congress-approvalrating-2012-gallup-10-percent.htm (noting that only ten percent of Americans approve of Congress’s
job performance).
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enforcement. 214 Furthermore, corporate defendants would have leverage
to negotiate mutually agreeable terms for their diversion agreements.215
If the government continues to settle FCPA cases with deferred and
non-prosecution agreements, 216 the courts must become more involved to
prevent prosecutorial overreaching and to ensure that FCPA claims
contain a strong legal foundation. Currently, these agreements are
deficient in explaining whether the defendant’s conduct satisfies each
element of the crime and whether there is proper legal precedent to
punish the corporate defendant. Instead, DPAs and NPAs simply recite
legal conclusions. 217 Once prosecutors and a corporate defendant have
settled the terms of their compliance and corporate monitoring programs,
the court should engage in a review of all admitted facts and legal
analyses to ensure that the elements required for a successful FCPA
action are satisfied by a greater weight of the evidence. 218 Under this
214

In 2009, Dow Jones Risk and Compliance conducted a survey that found 51% of
businesses delayed, and 14% abandoned, their business initiatives abroad due to confusion
surrounding anti-corruption laws, including the FCPA. See Press Release, Dow Jones, Dow Jones
Survey: Amid Confusion About Anti-Corruption Laws, Companies Abandon Expansion Plans (Dec.
9, 2009), available at http://fis.dowjones.com/risk/09survey.html. Furthermore, 40% of companies
avoided expansion into emerging markets out of fear of noncompliance with bribery laws. Id.
215
See Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. at 825
(noting that the current FCPA environment, where diversion agreements rarely receive judicial
scrutiny, encourages federal prosecutors to assert broad and vague theories of liability); GIBSON,
DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2010 YEAR-END UPDATE ON CORPORATE DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND
NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (Jan. 4, 2011), available at www.gibsondunn.com/publications/
Documents/2010Year-EndUpdate-CorporateDeferredProsecutionAndNonProsecutionAgreements.pdf (noting that because diversion agreements receive little to no judicial
scrutiny, the government inevitably takes expansive and untested positions).
216
See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2011 YEAR-END UPDATE ON CORPORATE
DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (Jan. 4, 2012), available at
http://gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2011YearEndUpdate-CorporateDeferredProsecutionNonProsecutionAgreements.aspx (noting that in 2011, DOJ agreements that settled FCPA charges
accounted for approximately 41% of all settlement agreements).
217
See, e.g., Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Div., to Paul Gerlach & Angela T.
Burgess, Attorneys for Smith & Nephew, Inc. (Feb. 1, 2012), available at
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/smith-nephew/2012-02-01-s-n-dpa.pdf (outlining the
terms of the deferred prosecution agreement and providing a statement of facts, yet providing no
analysis as to why the alleged facts prove an FCPA violation); Deferred Prosecution Agreement,
United States v. Marubeni Corp., No. 12-CR-022 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2012), available at
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/marubeni/2012-01-17-marubeni-dpa.pdf
(diversion
agreement providing only legal conclusions that the FCPA has been violated).
218
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2), federal courts have the authority to scrutinize diversion
agreements prior to giving their approval. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(h)(2) (Westlaw 2012). Also, the
criminal sentencing phase of trial provides a useful analogy where detailed pre-sentence reports are
created and a hearing is held to determine upward or downward departures from the Sentencing
Guidelines range. During these reviews of pre-sentence reports, judges are permitted to make
additional factual findings by a preponderance of the evidence under an advisory Sentencing
Guideline scheme. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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approach, judicial review of all DPAs and NPAs stemming from FCPA
violations would be a requirement for an enforceable agreement. 219
As part of its review process, a federal court should demand detailed
information as to how the admitted facts violate the specific provisions
of the Act. This information should include (1) the specific portions of
the FCPA alleged to have been violated, (2) the factual assertions
supporting the government’s allegation of corporate wrongdoing, (3)
how the admitted facts prove that each element of the relevant FCPA
provisions has been violated, and (4) the legal precedents supporting the
agency’s interpretation of the FCPA and its elements. 220 The parties may
provide this requisite information to the judiciary through a letter to the
court or a request for a hearing to brief the judge on the record. Efficient
parties would ultimately include this information in the diversion
agreement to facilitate more rapid approval.
The detailed information necessary to the review process is
beneficial for two reasons: first, the courts will be able to more
effectively scrutinize diversion agreements if the government is
transparent about how it is interpreting specific provisions and the legal
authority for its interpretation, and second, a detailed legal analysis
would equip corporations with a framework from which they will be
better able to mount defensive arguments, as well as provide critical
guidance as to how prosecutors are construing relevant provisions.
219

See Robert Plotkin et al., A New Era of Global Anti-Corruption Enforcement: FCPA and
UK Bribery Act Spur a Worldwide Focus on Corruption Prevention, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 14, 2012),
available at www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202541875631&A_New_Era_
of_Global_AntiCorruption_Enforcement&slreturn=1 (“[Richard Alderman, Director of the Serious
Fraud Office in the United Kingdom,] does not . . . advocate a U.S.-style system in which
prosecutors and corporations enter into ‘private agreements.’ Judicial oversight and approval is
paramount, he says, for ‘[o]nly a judge can decide whether the terms are appropriate.’”) (emphasis
added). See also the GAO report, which finds that judicial scrutiny on diversion agreements is
basically nonexistent and that judges have never modified a DPA or NPA. Mike Koehler, The
Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 935 (2010).
220

For many years the DOJ also has faced critiques regarding the lack of clarity surrounding the
factors considered when deciding whether to enter a DPA or an NPA. In October 2010, the
OECD publicly validated those concerns when it released its Phase 3 review of the United
States’ anti-bribery enforcement. In its report, the OECD noted that “[g]uidance on when
prosecutors may use PAs, DPAs and NPAs exists but is slightly uneven and indirect.” The
OECD also noted that “[p]ublishing more detailed reasons for entering into DPAs and NPAs
would give more insight into the DOJ’s choice of settlement agreements and, thus, enhance
accountability and transparency of the process.”
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2010 YEAR-END UPDATE ON CORPORATE DEFERRED
PROSECUTION AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (Jan. 4, 2011), available at
www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2010Year-EndUpdateCorporateDeferredProsecutionAndNon-ProsecutionAgreements.pdf (footnote omitted).
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This detailed information would be especially useful for the vague
FCPA provisions, namely the business nexus requirement. Expansive
and broadening interpretations of the nexus would remain in check
because the DOJ’s allegations as to what payments are prohibited would
no longer be the driving force behind the law. Based on the legal
authority cited by the government, the court can assess whether the
DOJ’s interpretation is impermissibly far-reaching and thus unfair to the
weaker party in a one-sided deal.
In determining the nature and extent of their review of diversion
agreements, courts must draw from other securities laws due to the
meager FCPA case law that currently exists. 221 Looking outside the
bounds of the case and into another area of law for guidance on a legal
issue is not foreign to the courts when those two areas are analogous. 222
The overwhelming majority of civil and criminal FCPA actions are
resolved almost identically, typically through parallel proceedings. 223 In
221

See United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1079 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e consider it to
be appropriate in some situations to seek guidance from civil jurisprudence in performing the
criminal sentencing function, and do not hesitate to do so in this case . . . .”); United States v.
Leonard, 529 F.3d 83, 93 n.11 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he district court may look to principles governing
recovery of damages in civil securities fraud cases for guidance in calculating the loss amount for
purposes of the Guidelines.”).
222
See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1146 (9th Cir. 2004) (“As the district court
observed, there is a paucity of appellate court decisions analyzing section 877’s requirements for
review. In order to respond to the district court’s argument, therefore, I must reason by analogy and
look to general principles of administrative law formulated under the APA.” (citation omitted));
Fernandez de Iglesias v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 352, 359 (2010) (“In ruling on Mexican law, a
judge must look to the code, but ‘[i]f there are gaps or lacunae in the code (that is, there are no
statutes which specifically pertain to the particular case), the judge must nevertheless decide the
case, either by use of general clauses, by analogy, or by applying general principles of law.’”
(citation omitted)); In re USACafes, L.P. Litig., 600 A.2d 43, 48 (Del. Ch. 1991) (“While I find no
corporation law precedents directly addressing the question whether directors of a corporate general
partner owe fiduciary duties to the partnership and its limited partners, the answer to it seems to be
clearly indicated by general principles and by analogy to trust law.”).
223
In an enforcement action where the DOJ and SEC conduct parallel proceedings, the
corporate defendant must pay millions in disgorgement, civil and criminal penalties, and the
implementation of compliance and monitoring programs. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, SEC Charges Armor Holdings, Inc. with FCPA Violations in Connection with Sales to the
United Nations (July 13, 2011), available at www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-146.htm; see also
SEC.
&
EXCH.
COMM’N,
SEC
Enforcement
Actions:
FCPA
Cases,
U.S.
www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2012) (listing all FCPA
enforcement actions from 1978 to 2012 and whether each case was a parallel proceeding).
Furthermore, in May 2011, the SEC entered into its first DPA to resolve an FCPA violation. Press
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Tenaris to Pay $5.4 Million in SEC’s First-Ever Deferred
Prosecution Agreement (May 17, 2011), available at www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-112.htm.
The settlement agreement entered into between Tenaris and the SEC contains many of the same
terms as the DPAs executed by the DOJ. Compare U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Deferred
Prosecution Agreement (May 17, 2011), available at www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-112dpa.pdf (civil DPA), with Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Div., to Paul Gerlach &
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settlement agreements that treat matters more akin to civil enforcement
rather than traditional criminal prosecutions, the DOJ becomes a quasiThis is because—in the context of corporate
civil regulator. 224
conduct—both parties are negotiating and agreeing from the outset as
opposed to reaching an agreement after preparing for litigation. 225 Thus,
federal judges may borrow principles from other civil securities laws
when scrutinizing a corporate defendant’s settlement agreement in an
FCPA case.
Federal District Court Judge Jed S. Rakoff’s widely publicized
denial of a proposed settlement in S.E.C. v. Citigroup Global Markets
Inc. 226 can serve as a guidepost for judges seeking to review a DPA. In
that case, the court determined that the applicable standard of review for
a settlement of securities fraud charges is “whether the proposed Consent
Judgment . . . is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the public interest.”227
Judge Rakoff emphasized that before approving a consent decree the
court must be satisfied that sufficient information has been provided to
ensure that the government’s requested relief is justified. 228 This is so
“the court [does not] become a mere handmaiden to a settlement [that is]
privately negotiated . . . .”229
Although Citigroup Global Markets involved a civil securities fraud
issue, federal courts reviewing FCPA diversion agreements should apply

Angela T. Burgess, Attorneys for Smith & Nephew, Inc. (Feb. 1, 2012), available at
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/smith-nephew/2012-02-01-s-n-dpa.pdf (criminal DPA).
224
See Gabe Friedman, White-Collar Lawyers Await New FCPA Guidance, DAILY J., Mar. 2,
2012 (noting that FCPA enforcement focuses on settlement rather than litigation, and that “‘[i]t
hasn’t been a decision of do we charge or don’t charge a company.’ . . . ‘There’s been all these
gradations of how can we strike agreements with these companies.’” (quoting professor of law Wes
Porter)).
225
See Mike Koehler, FCPA 101: How Are FCPA Enforcement Actions Typically Resolved?,
FCPA PROFESSOR, www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101#q15 (last visited Feb. 7, 2012) (“Nearly every
FCPA enforcement action against a company in this era of FCPA enforcement is resolved through a
non-prosecution agreement (‘NPA’) or a deferred prosecution agreement (‘DPA’)”); John Gibeaut,
Battling Bribery Abroad, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 18, 2007), www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
battling_bribery_abroad/ (noting that because corporations accused of FCPA violations are more
interested in staying in business, they prefer to settle rather than engage in costly litigation).
226
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7387 (JSR), 2011
WL 5903733 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2011).
227
Id. at *2.
228
See id. at *3.
229
Id. at *4. The court in this case was troubled by the SEC’s long-standing policy of
allowing corporate defendants to neither admit nor deny the allegations of the complaint when
entering into a consent judgment. Id. at *1.
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the same standard. 230 Now that the SEC has shifted its policy of civil
settlement in securities fraud cases to require admissions of conduct,231
these settlements appear almost identical to the DPAs handed down by
Justice officials where admissions of fact and agreements to implement
corrective programs exist in both. Because these two types of
agreements impact corporate defendants in an analogous manner, courts
should borrow the civil standard to review a criminal diversion
agreement.
Accordingly, a diversion agreement or the ancillary information
requested by the courts must be “fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the
public interest.” 232 Using its discretion, a court can evaluate whether the
agreement is fair to both the parties and the public. 233 In determining
whether the agreement is “reasonable,” the court should examine
whether the DOJ’s legal interpretations are consistent with congressional
intent and statutory construction of the FCPA. 234 Although courts
provide deference to the government’s legal interpretation, the judiciary
must still review agreements where one party has the obvious bargaining
advantage. Doing so serves as a critical check and balance designed to
prevent federal prosecutors from unilaterally expanding the interpretation
of any provision of the FCPA, particularly the business nexus
requirement. 235
230

The author recognizes that the civil settlement agreement in Citigroup Global Markets
varied from traditional DOJ DPAs because of a corporate defendant’s ability to neither admit nor
deny the alleged facts.
231
Edward Wyatt, S.E.C. Changes Policy on Firms’ Admission of Guilt, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,
2012, available at www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/business/sec-to-change-policy-on-companiesadmission-of-guilt.html. It is important to note that this policy shift applies only to civil settlement
agreements where defendants have admitted wrongdoing in a corresponding criminal proceeding.
Id. The SEC is continuing to use the “neither admit nor deny” settlement process when they are the
only agency reaching a deal with a defendant. Id.
232
See Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 2011 WL 5903733, at *2.
233
See id. at *3 (“Before the Court determines whether the settlement is fair, it must ask a
preliminary question: fair to whom? . . . [T]he answer is, fair to the parties and to the public.”).
234

[I]f the statute is ambiguous and Congress’s intent is not clear, “the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” If the
agency’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable and permissible, then the court should
defer to the agency’s interpretation.
Julia Di Vito, Note, The New Meaning of New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 46 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 307, 323 (2011) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837
(1984)).
235
See Richard A. Epstein, The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2006,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116468395737834160.html (stating that a DPA
undermines the separation of powers by eroding the protections of criminal law and turning the
prosecutor into a judge).
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CONCLUSION
Congress’s attempt at curtailing foreign bribery with the passage of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 was initially greeted with an
abundance of optimism. 236 The primary function of the FCPA was
twofold: first, to prohibit improper business practices, and second, to
encourage more ethical business activity. 237 In spite of Congress’s
attempts at reining in unethical bribery payments, the FCPA was
burdened with vague and ambiguous terms, leading to lax enforcement.
In an effort to strengthen enforcement, Congress amended the FCPA in
1988 and 1998. 238 These congressional amendments, however, were
silent as to a crucial component of the FCPA: the business nexus
requirement. 239 Because of this devastating omission, the vagueness of
the Act persists, forcing American businesses to establish intricate and
expensive compliance programs. These programs have the effect of
drastically increasing transaction costs, thus leading to inefficient
markets. 240
The Fifth Circuit’s 2004 decision in United States v. Kay sought to
clarify the business nexus requirement and to enhance enforcement of the
FCPA. Though Kay has had an enormous impact on how the U.S.
government prosecutes FCPA violations, 241 these efforts have been
accompanied by unintended consequences. As a result of the sharp
increase in FCPA cases post-Kay, the Department of Justice has favored
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements. 242 Though these

236

S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 4 (1977) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098 (“A
strong antibribery law is urgently needed to bring these corrupt practices to a halt and to restore
public confidence in the integrity of the American business system.”).
237
See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4-5 (1977) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. NO. 95-114 (1977) (Conf.
Rep.), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098.
238
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107;
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302.
239
See H.R. REP. NO. 100-576 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547.
The conferees decided not to adopt the House bill that clarified the nexus requirement, leaving the
Act unchanged with respect to this provision. Id.
240
See Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 1001-02
(2010) (“[C]ompliance based solely on an enforcement agency’s untested or dubious interpretation
of a law is wasteful and diverts corporate resources from other value-added endeavors.”).
241
See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2010 MID-YEAR FCPA UPDATE (July 8, 2010),
available at www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2010Mid-YearFCPAUpdate.aspx (detailing
the increasing trend in FCPA enforcement post-Kay).
242
See Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial
Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1863 (2005)
(due to a wave of white-collar crime, federal prosecutors have increased their use of diversion
agreements for corporate defendants); GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2010 MID-YEAR FCPA
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agreements help to bypass costly litigation, they have essentially created
a system that encourages prosecutorial abuse and deters behavior never
intended by Congress in 1977 to fall within the scope of the FCPA.
In order to combat these effects, the judiciary must take an active
role in scrutinizing the settlement agreements entered into by corporate
defendants. The prevalence of such agreements prevents these cases
from ever being litigated and creates an environment where prosecutors
can broadly interpret the FCPA. However, requiring the parties to a
diversion agreement to provide the court with detailed information
justifying the government’s allegations creates transparency and provides
corporations with guidance as to how the FCPA and its provisions are
interpreted.
Ultimately, U.S. businesses should not be subject to the whims of an
idle legislature and aggressive executive. Whether a company’s
payments directly or indirectly obtain business, one fact remains clear:
the lack of clarity regarding what types of behavior are prohibited has
made the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act a highly feared law. In an effort
to calm these fears, federal courts must act to protect the rights of
defendants.

UPDATE (July 8, 2010), available at www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2010MidYearFCPAUpdate.aspx (detailing the increasing trend in FCPA enforcement post-Kay).
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